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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 




                         





Appellant                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-09-cr-00137-001) 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 13, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  November 29, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
On November 16, 2010, after a six-week trial, Appellant David Moro was 
convicted of thirty-three counts of conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, bank fraud, money 
laundering, and making false statements to government officials.  On October 12, 2011, 
Judge Walls sentenced Moro to a term of imprisonment of 126 months, to be followed by 
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a five-year term of supervised release.  Additionally, Judge Walls ordered Moro to pay 
restitution totaling $3,589,350 to various victims.  Moro’s appeal is currently before this 
Court.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court. 
I.  Background 
  
 We write principally for the benefit of the parties and therefore recount only those 
facts essential to our review.   
 In 1999, Moro founded Inchon LLC, a company whose purpose was to bring 
Russian-language radio and Internet-based programs to a global audience.  (App. 2153, 
2155.)  In addition to receiving investments to develop Inchon’s hardware and software, 
Inchon also received financing from banks and other lenders for the purpose of acquiring 
digital servers to further develop Inchon’s digital programming.  (App. 68-69, 119, 1013-
14, 2169-71.)  The lenders purchased the servers from a vendor, which then leased the 
servers to Inchon.  (Id.)  Moro, however, arranged for the vendor to give Inchon the 
money the lenders had paid to purchase the servers and used those funds for other 
purposes.  (App. 1134.)  In other words, instead of applying for the funds directly, Moro 
used the vendors to obtain funds from the lenders.  (App. 1084, 2192, 2198.)  In 
connection with these transactions, the government alleged that Moro misrepresented 
Inchon’s financial health, mischaracterized the relationship between the vendors and 
Inchon, prepared fraudulent tax filings and invoices, and attempted to shift blame for the 
fraudulent financial information to a fictitious individual.  Moro denied this fraudulent 
scheme. 
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 On February 27, 2009, a grand jury returned a 34-count indictment, charging 
Moro with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349), six counts 
of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), five counts of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), three 
counts of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344), seventeen counts of money laundering (18 
U.S.C. § 1957), and two counts of making false and fraudulent statements to government 
officials (18 U.S.C. § 1001).  (App. 2853-77.)  On September 28, 2010, a jury trial 
commenced before Judge Walls, and on the fourth day of trial, Moro requested “hybrid” 
representation, or alternatively, to proceed pro se.  (App. 255.)  The District Court 
permitted Moro to proceed pro se, with “standby counsel,” but refused to permit hybrid 
representation.  (App. 281.)  Nearly five weeks later, the jury returned a guilty verdict on 
all counts except for one count of making false and fraudulent statements to government 
officials.   
 The instant appeal followed.  Moro asserts four issues on appeal: (1) whether the 
District Court erred in denying Moro’s request for “hybrid” representation and whether 
the District Court properly ensured that Moro’s decision to proceed pro se was voluntary; 
(2) whether the District Court erred by permitting the government to present certain 
evidence; (3) whether Moro’s convictions on the money laundering counts were 
supported by legally sufficient evidence; and (4) whether the District Court erred by 
commenting on Moro’s military service at sentencing.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  This Court has jurisdiction to review Moro’s 
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
4  
II.  Discussion 
A.  “Hybrid” Representation 
 The first issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Moro’s 
request for “hybrid” representation and whether the District Court properly ensured that 
Moro’s decision to proceed pro se was voluntary.   We review a district court’s decision 
addressing a defendant’s request for hybrid representation for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Bankoff, 613 F.3d 358, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Stevens, 
83 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1996).  We give plenary review as to the voluntariness of a 
defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.  United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 127 
(3d Cir. 2002).  
A criminal defendant has no right to “hybrid” representation.  McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984).  Moreover, a “defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to choreograph special appearances by counsel.”  Id.  Accordingly, 
the decision to permit a defendant to proceed as “co-counsel” in his own case, or pro se, 
is within the discretion of the District Court.  Bankoff, 613 F.3d at 373-74 (quoting 
Stevens, 83 F.3d at 67).  The District Court refused to permit hybrid representation in this 
case.  (App. 281-82.)  We find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
arriving at that decision.   
Moro also claims that the waiver of his right to counsel was involuntary because 
the District Court erroneously denied his request for hybrid representation, and therefore, 
he was compelled to proceed pro se.  Because we find that the District Court did not err 
in refusing to grant Moro’s request for hybrid representation, this claim fails.  
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Furthermore, the record is replete with evidence to suggest that Moro’s waiver of counsel 
was knowing and understanding, and voluntary.  See Peppers, 302 F.3d at 130-31  
(finding that waiver of Sixth Amendment rights must be knowing and understanding, and 
voluntary).  The record affirmatively indicates that Moro clearly and unequivocally 
declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself; that he was literate, 
competent, and understanding; and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free 
will.  See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the District Court’s denial of Moro’s request to proceed with hybrid representation and 
conclude that Moro’s waiver of counsel was voluntary.   
B.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 Moro also alleges that he was deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial 
misconduct, because the government (1) posed guilt-assuming hypothetical questions to 
witnesses, (2) asked a witness what Moro meant in recorded conversations, and (3) used 
the terms “confession” and “admission” in summation.  In reviewing claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct, the standard of review depends on whether the defendant 
asserted objections: when contemporaneous objections are asserted, we review the 
District Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, and any non-contemporaneous objections 
are subject to plain error review.  United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Regardless of what standard of review we apply in this case, we find that the 
government did not commit misconduct.  We cannot find that the questioning by the 
government was inappropriate – at any rate, it certainly did not rise to a level that 
warrants setting aside Moro’s conviction.  Furthermore, the record does not indicate that 
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the government exceeded its “considerable latitude in summation.”  United States v. Lee, 
612 F.3d 170, 194 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 117 (3d 
Cir. 1991)). 
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 Next, we address Moro’s argument that his convictions on Counts Sixteen through 
Thirty-Two of the Indictment, for laundering criminally-derived proceeds in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), must be reversed because the evidence was legally insufficient to 
support the jury’s verdict.  This Court applies a highly deferential standard of review to 
challenges on sufficiency grounds, United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 
2001), and will only reverse where there is “no evidence, regardless of how it is 
weighted, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States 
v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 108 
F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1997)).   
Section 1957(a) of title 18 makes it unlawful for a person to “knowingly engage[] 
or attempt[] to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value 
greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity.”  The term 
“criminally derived property” means “any property constituting, or derived from, 
proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2).  Moro argues that 
“proceeds,” in this case, means “net profits,” and that the government failed to prove that 
the transactions involved net profits.  The Supreme Court addressed whether the term 
“proceeds” in federal money laundering statutes refers to the “gross receipts” or the “net 
profits” from a criminal enterprise in United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008).  
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Justice Stevens’ controlling concurring opinion concluded that “proceeds” means “net 
profits” only where a merger problem increases a defendant’s sentencing exposure in a 
way Congress could not have intended.  Id. at 525, 528 n.7.  Additionally, in the Third 
Circuit, “proceeds are derived from an already completed offense, or a completed phase 
of an ongoing offense, before they can be laundered.”  United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 
178, 186 (quoting United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 980 (3d Cir. 1994)).   
In this case, each fraud offense was complete when the victimized lender sent 
money to vendors.  (App. 2861-70.)  The § 1957 offenses charge the subsequent transfers 
of those fraudulent proceeds to Inchon.  (App. 2871-72.)  Thus, those subsequent 
transfers were not essential elements of the completed fraud offenses, and there was 
therefore no merger problem.  See Abuhouran v. Grondolsky, 643 F. Supp. 2d 654, 669 
(D.N.J. 2009) (“Whatever was done with the proceeds of each loan was the start of a new 
activity, a separate crime if done with the requisite intent.”), aff’d 392 Fed. App’x 78 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Because there was undoubtedly sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude 
that the transfers charged in Counts 16-32 involved the “gross proceeds” of the fraud 
offenses charged in Counts 2-15, Moro’s sufficiency challenge fails. 
D.  Sentencing 
Finally, we address Moro’s argument that the District Court erred during 
sentencing by treating Moro’s military service as an aggravating factor.  It is clear from 
the record that the District Court did not treat Moro’s military service as an aggravating 
factor at sentencing.  Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not err, and 
accordingly, we will affirm Moro’s sentence.   
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III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
